



The Credence and Compossibility of Apodeictic Values: An Indian Precedence
Dr. N. Usha

ABSTRACT

Apodeictic values are described in Aristotelian logic. It refers to propositions that are demonstrable and logically understandable. Apodeictic judgement are clearly provable and logically certain. Apodeictic is opposed to 'dialectic', probable reasoning. Apodeictic also refers to the type of human knowledge characterised by evidence and certainty. The propose of apodeictic knowledge is to present the structure of Reality by showing its ultimate cause in most general conceptions and to provide assertions on the fact that subordinate reality to these is acceptable.

KEYWORDS

Apodeictic, Assertoric

RESEARCH PROBLEM

Apodeictic concept can be acquired independently of experience. States of consciousness determine the certainty of defining the object and thereby the apodeictic values and judgements. Physical and mental judgements belong to the apodeictic category. Apodeictic values are based on belief of the truthfulness of the object in question. These are based on the mental predispositions and are based on the unique experience of self-consciousness.

METHODOLOGY

Anaytic

CONTENT

The main issue addressed in this article is to account for the values developed in terms of Aristotelian concept on certainty of knowledge and its methodology elicited in the ancient Indian literature. From an Indian context of the Vedic and UpaniÅadic premises *knowledge* is accountable only as a form of consciousness which is confronted with terms such as cognition, awareness and experience. Though it is difficult to define *knowledge* accurately and with certainty yet it is not impossible to define it through characterization for a proper understanding on it. The Vedas or the scriptural texts that reveal the experiences of the ancient seers in India mull over the indefinable and infallible knowledge as '*Consciousness*'. In this premise of Consciousness knowledge becomes a true belief that can completely be justifiable. There are three outcomes of this knowledge-

- 1) what we are conscious of about is true;
- 2) what we believe is true and
- 3) The truthfulness of this belief is based on the ground of sufficient evidences.

These constitute what is called the premise of knowledge. This can be better understood on the concepts developed by Aristotle. He uses the terms "**Apodeictic**" "**Assertoric**" and "**Problematic**" to elaborate the premise of knowledge.

The term "**Apodictic**" or "**apodeictic**" ([Ancient Greek](#): capable of demonstration) is an [adjectival](#) expression taken from [Aristotelean logic](#) that refers to [propositions](#) that are demonstrable, that are necessarily or [self-evidently](#) the case or that, conversely, are impossible. Apodicticity refers to [logical certainty](#). The Apodictic propositions are contrary to problematic propositions, which assert only the possibility of something being true. According to [Franz Brentano](#),¹ "judgments may be either assertoric or apodictic. Assertoric judgments are judgments which are possibly true but are unproven." Apodictic judgments are judgments which are clearly provable and logically certain. For example, the statement: one plus one equals two is certainty and hence is apodictic. The Bay of Bengal is smaller than Indian Ocean is assertoric is possibly true but cannot be proven. "A person is wealthier than a country" is problematic. In [Aristotelian](#) logic, "apodictic" is opposed to "[dialectic](#)," as [scientific proof](#) because of the fact that it is opposed to probable [reasoning](#). For Immanuel [Kant](#), these three - apodictic, problematic, and assertoric are contrary.² Apodictic also refers to the style of argumentation in which a person presents his reasoning as being categorically true, even if it is not necessarily so. Hence, apodictic means that which can clearly be shown or proved; absolutely certain or necessarily true.

Apodictic knowledge refers to the type of human knowledge characterized by evidence(Provability) and certainty, like the conception of science; the source of its evidence and certainty is the certainty of its premises. The purpose of apodictic knowledge is to present the structure of Reality by showing its ultimate causes in most general conceptions and to provide assertions on the fact that no subordinate reality to these is acceptable. Further it can be said that apodictic knowledge is opposed under the aspect of evidence and certainty to dialectical knowledge which begins from uncertain and non-evident premises.

Apodictic knowledge is composed of two kinds of elements: definitions and assertions. Definitions (these are real definitions) present the essence of objects studied, while assertions present the connections between these objects. Though the mind gets there by induction it grasps them by intellectual intuition which directly provides knowledge of the essence of the thing designated by the primitive terms and directly provides an affirmation of the evident truth of ultimate assertions. The mind comes upon them in a necessary way by modifying its extent and gets the so called knowledge of the object or the reality of the object. According to Aristotle science aims at an adequate understanding of the objective reality.

Assertoric Knowledge: a statement that asserts something is the case, but there is nothing in the statement that makes it inherently true or false. The statement can only be verified by reference to something outside of the statement. In **Problematic** knowledge a statement indicates that something *could* be true--that there is nothing in the statement itself that prevents it from being true. Now let me elaborate the conceptual

issues of the apodeictic, assertive and problematic values that are discussed on the Vedic and UpaniÅadic contexts. This involves the tenets of knowledge premise where consciousness without content becomes the assertoric and the consciousness with content is apodictive.

Human consciousness is always a conscious awareness of something and it is only the mind that rises or sets during these conscious states of mind causing cognition and cognition-related experiences, storing and retrieving them in respective phases. This gives the knowledge of whatever seen as such and such and is evidenced and is certainty which means apodictic. There is also a phase when no cognitions or cognition-related activity is taking place and it is the original or normal or natural state of human mind, the non-dual or peaceful, blissful or silent phase of mind which sets in the knowledge as *consciousness* but it is limiting, definable and justifiable. The Vedic seers declare that the truth in the form of *consciousness* can be justifiable in the super-sensual experiences and it is same for all those who experience it in this way. But in terms of the epistemic or commonsense perception this truth is not definable and hence not justifiable. The UpaniÅads also declare that the highest truth as **Brahman** is inconceivable and what we can do the most is accept the Vedic truths on the definition of Consciousness since there is no other means for its validation. Further the question of oneness of Brahman has no proof of It except in Its realization.

The UpaniÅadic tradition holds that consciousness is one, homogeneous and undifferentiated. Consciousness (Cit) and Experience (Anubhava) therefore are non-different. Consciousness is self-revealing and so is anubhava. Cognition from the epistemic point of view involves mental modifications and leads to knowledge like perceptual, inferential etc. which has apodictic value in certainty, whereas from the metaphysical point of view, though it involves the mind, it does not have modifications, and therefore leads to the anubhava of the Reality for the person who intuitively and thence it is called '*intuition*'. That the case of Pure Consciousness appears to be many in cognition due to its conditioning by objects. Similar is the case of '*experience*' which is distinct in its states of occurrence as waking, dream and sleep. These three states of experience constitute the three worlds- the waking experience of the subject to the principles of space, time, causality etc., world of dream experience where things perceived appear as not only subjective but objective, and deep sleep- where there is no perception of either subject or object.

For the traditional thinkers in India, whatever is shown or revealed by consciousness cannot be rejected and whatever is not shown or revealed cannot be accepted. The world exists as long as the 'I' exists. There are two kinds of vision (dṛṣṭi) - the real (pīramāṛthika) and empirical (laukika).³ The former is the vision of consciousness (intuition) while the latter is the seeing through the mind (*cognition*). The latter which involves the knowledge of the object through the mind is the '*modal cognition*' (vṛttijijñāna), and hence it is assertoric from the epistemic point. Here consciousness alone is able to reveal the things through the mind. The mind itself cannot impart any knowledge.

One important question here is in terms of the Vedic and UpaniÅadic thinking only Brahman is true. It is the only assertive truth. The world is a manifestation of Brahman in the adjuncts of Avidya/ Mīyī. Then how can the epistemic or modal cognition become apodictic? It has uncertainty from the transcendental level. The internal organ or the mind is the first entity that the consciousness gets associated giving rise to the 'I' or 'ego' which again is transcendent to it and different from it. It appears as 'I' in empirical terms or ego-consciousness. In this context the relation between the transcendental Self and the empirical 'I' is like the relation of the revealers and the revealed (avabhāṣaka- avabhāṣya sambandha). The empirical Self functions through the mind-sense-body complex and it is the false self (mithyātma). One has to admit that whatever is cognized must be admitted to be existent. The Nīṣadṛya Sūktā⁴ declares that regarding the judgements claiming validation of the truth concerned with the truth of the Absolute or Brahman only a postulation is possible and it is 'seeing' or 'experiencing' by oneself that only can validate the actuality of the truth. This means aspects of certainty are limited to experience. This gives the possibility of applying the apodictic values to judgements.

Evaluation of the certainty of truth

Now the question is : How, or on what basis, a proposition might be known with certainty? In general terms, a proposition is knowable as apodictic if it is knowable independently of experience, while a proposition is knowable as assertorically if it is knowable on the basis of experience. The distinction between these two kinds of knowledge thus broadly corresponds to the distinction between empirical and non-empirical knowledge. Such a distinction can be applied to things other than ways of knowing, for instance, to propositions and arguments. This distinction can also be applied to concepts. An apodictic concept is one that can be acquired independently of experience, which may – but need not – involve its being innate, while the apprehension of an assertoric concept requires experience. The component of knowledge to which this distinction is immediately relevant is that of justification or warrant that refer to the main component of knowledge beyond that of true belief. If a person claims to know a given proposition with certainty it is to say that his justification for believing this proposition with certainty is independent of experience. The traditional view of justification is that to be justified in apprehending something is to have an epistemic reason to support it, a validating reason for thinking that it is true. On the contrary, ‘to be assertorically justified’ is to have a reason for thinking that a given proposition is true that is derived from experience. One is able to see or apprehend the truth of these claims just by reflecting on their content.

There is a close connection between the concepts for the warp and woof of experience. To have a concept implies to be conscious of something and contrarily to be conscious is to have a concept. If the truth of a certain proposition is strictly a matter of the definition of its terms then knowledge of this proposition is unlikely to require experience (rational reflection alone will likely suffice). On the other hand, if the truth of a proposition depends on how the world actually is cognized, then knowledge of it would require empirical vision. Whatever position is taken the distinction depends on some psychological function. It is interestingly found that the process of thinking continues even if there is no object physically. This kind of thinking is the realm of concepts. The apprehension of these concepts depends on experience. And that at a higher level leads to self-knowledge as the Vedic seers hold on. The truthfulness of these concepts is the realm of experience. If there is homogenization of the views of different persons those truths become apodictic. This is what the Vedas disclose and the UpaniÅads give us the keys to such knowledge.

There may arise the question of the sense in which a claim must be declared as knowable if it is to qualify as either apodictic or assertoric. For whom such a claim is knowable? Nevertheless, it would seem a mistake to define “knowable” so broadly that a proposition could qualify as either apodictic or assertoric if it were knowable only by a very few human beings or seers. Thus, in a true evaluation a necessarily true proposition is one that is true in every possible worlds, and false proposition is one that is false in every possible worlds. It is also reasonable to expect that if a given claim is true, it must be knowable apodictically. Sense- experience can tell us only about the actual world of experience and hence about what is the definable case; it can say nothing about what *must or must not* be the case of concepts or mental realm.

Apodicticity of ‘Experience’

As stated above, it was noted that an assertoric justification is said to derive from experience and an apodictic justification is independent of experience. To further clarify this distinction it is required to clarify on the relevant sense of ‘experience’. Experience, to elaborate on clearly has no specific characterization. Philosophers instead refer it as experience only. Experience is of two types- *sensory* experience and super- sensory experience. Experience could not be taken for assertoric justification as this would exclude from the sources memory and introspection. Such exclusions are problematic for in most cases related to memory and introspective justification they resemble sensory justification more than they resemble apodectic justification. In this context to characterize experience including any kind of conscious mental phenomenon or process becomes problematic. This is clearly evidenced in the case of rational insight, which many ancient seers considered to play a central role in their justification through experience. These seers describe assertoric justifications as involving a kind of rational “seeing” (Tattvad=Åti- visualization of the Reality) or perception of the truth on Reality.

However, one can find an apparent difference between apodictic and assertoric justification which delineate the relevant conception of experience. In the case of apodictic justification, the objects of cognition

represent the objective world which may or may not be true in other cognitive states. Moreover, it can be said that the relation between these objects and the cognitive states is causal only. It can also be said that in the case of assertoric these conditions would not apply. In such cases, the objects of cognition become abstract entities existing across all cognitive levels. Therefore, an adequate definition of 'experience' must include introspection and memory.

It seems to be necessary to understand the way in which the assertoric is thought to be independent of experience. Two alternatives can be claimed to provide justification for the fact that the assertoric can be said *not* to be independent of experience – one is to overcome the belief in the claim about its justification which cannot be possible without experience. Such a belief does not emerge from experience but as the UpaniÅadic seers say this arises from rational reflection. Moreover, the very notion of epistemic justification takes care of understanding of that believed proposition. Therefore, understanding (Manana) plays a major role in epistemic reasoning to support the beliefs. In this connection experience becomes a precondition for apodictic justification. The second view is the thinking that justification depending on experience challenges such a justification. This is contrary to the position of the Vedic and UpaniÅadic seers who considered the Vedas as infallible justifications on Reality. Though some of the contemporary philosophers deny infallibility of the Vedas, this infallibility on apodictic justification does not undermine the relevance of experience.

Now the question is: How can reason or rational reflection by itself lead a person to think that a particular proposition is justified? This question is attended by the seers with an appeal to the notion of rational insight. It is rational 'seeing' or grasping of the truth. These are epistemically more illuminating justifications.

An Indian precedence on cognition:

A significant point to be noted in this connection is the fact that orientational or valuational concepts primarily deal with justifications on the assertoric values of the Absolute truth that indicates the realm of this truth which is just like non-existence (asat). The concepts like, Brahman, ŚŒnya are inconceivable and cannot be definable. These words do not exactly indicate what these are. They are treated as existing for these are experienced in a peculiar supersensuous state. Those who elaborate on these based on their experience describe as this and that. Can such a concept be claimed as justification of the Real? It is Consciousness that can change the relationship between the mind and the objects of the world, producing what are known as [altered states of consciousness](#). And these states determine the certainty of defining the object and thereby the apodictic values and judgements whereas the original consciousness only supplements the knowledge of truth that underlies all experiences of the 'essential' one. The Vedas call it Caitanya meaning 'consciousness' It is the pure [Consciousness](#) the consciousness that knows itself and also knows others In the Rig Veda,⁵ *NriÅad* is the dweller amongst men; *NriÅad* is explained as *Caitanya* or 'Consciousness'. In the [UpaniÅads](#), it is explained that the Ētman, the Self, represents itself differently according to the dominant principle of the consciousness in the individual being. These different states of consciousness are –Physical, Mental, Supra-intellectual, and Consciousness proper. The judgements of the first two belong to the apodictic category while those of the supra-intellectual are assertoric judgements dependent on experience of an individual. The consciousness proper is uncontradicted and is true for all times but the knowledge of it is only a possibility in epistemic conditions.

The Vedas and UpaniÅads elaborate that human mind functions in *JiĒrat* (wakeful conscious state) and *Swapna* (dream conscious state) – termed as *dvaita* (Two – **aham- idam**) conscious states – using the mental tools and simultaneously uses these *JiĒrat* and *Swapna* conscious states and alternates between *dvaita* and *advaita* - No Two – **only Aham – Aham** - the *JiĒrat SuÅuĒpti*- conscious state and aids humans to know, reason, do intellectual operations, understand, experience the truthfulness of the judgements. In the *dvaita* (**aham-idam**) conscious state a differentiated perception of knower and known exists while

knowing and making judgements. Thus a triad (*triputī*) of knower-knowing-known exists and is perceived. The perception of this triad is absent in *advaita* (**Aham-Aham**) conscious state; then perception of knower and known gets absorbed in knowing and only awareness of knowing in the form of meaningful experience /experienced meaning/understanding remains/results. In the final or non-dual or *advaita* state experience/ understanding / sense (of a word) becomes fully cognitive and it is the true judgement or experience for an individual.

Apodictic Values

So far the discussion is centred on the nature of apodictic knowledge. Now it is required to find out whether there exists any relevance of this apodictic knowledge on values. The most notable point in this regard to be accounted for is the fact of consciousness that is manifest in man as consciousness of something that is mental phenomena. But one cannot neglect the original unmanifest consciousness which is subjective and because of this human beings become self-conscious. This self-consciousness ascertains the true nature of the things. The fact is that when one becomes fully self-conscious he develops the apodictic character, for the truth is understood with certainty. This truth is assertoric for common man for he believes it as truth but not with certainty and therefore it is assertoric. Apodictic values on the other hand are based on belief of the truthfulness of the object in question. The assertoric ones are experience-based which are the consequence of the real experience of the content. It is precisely the view of the conscious mind which posits itself as the universal knower. But, it does not rule out the fact that there are other similar centres of consciousness that are real. The self-awareness is the basic feature of self-consciousness as declared by the Vedic and Upaniṣadic thinkers and that brings in non-distinction on the real nature of that content. However, since the self-consciousness remains outside the premise of both the physical and mental the dualism of facts exists which forms the ground of distinction between the apodictic and the assertoric.

FINDING AND CONCLUSIONS

The hardcore problem on the Consciousness that deserves attention is that there is no standard definition or scientific explanation of it. According to the Vedic tradition consciousness pertains to human body without being identical to it which implies that there is a state of Consciousness that stands above the physical and mental realms. This fact points out the primacy of consciousness that can only be posited and not defined with certainty. This marks the assertoric value of the Consciousness and that is developed in the form of perfection or independence of worldly associations. The Upaniṣadic seers conceive this kind of values as the definite prerequisites for the accountability towards the learning of scriptures.

To conclude, apodictic values are deeply laid out on the basis of mental predispositions and those values that conform to self-consciousness are independent of the mental realm and are based on the unique experience of self-consciousness.

END NOTES

- 1- Franz Brentano: The True and the Evident.
- 2- I. Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, p.p. A70/B95.
- 3- 3.Brhadīra_yaka Upaniṣad: III.iv.2.
- 4- 4.Īgveda, Nīsadṛya Sṅkta: 10.129
- 5- 5.Rg Veda: IV.XL.5
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